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A decade ago most attorneys were unable to differentiate between
mediation and arbitration. Today because of increased publicity about
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), including many continuing legal
education offerings on the subject, attorneys are overwhelmingly able to
understand this difference. The present problem, however, is the inability of
attorneys to appreciate distinctions among a broader range of ADR
procedures that may in practice be loosely referred to as "mediation."
In fact, there is no single limiting definition of mediation, in part because
mediators function in accordance with different philosophies and in
stylistically different ways. One aspect of these differences is the extent to
which mediation practitioners engage in evaluative mediation. At one
extreme a mediator may be explicitly evaluative. At the other extreme a
mediator may avoid any suggestion of evaluative opinion. And then there are
intermediate possibilities, in which a mediator may use suggestions-ranging
from overt to subtle-predictive of a likely outcome. The propriety of
evaluative mediation has been heavily debated over the last few years.1 This
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1 E.g., John Bickerman, Evaluative Mediator Responds, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 70 (1996); Scott H. Hughes, Facilitative or Evaluative Mediation: May Your
Choice Be a Wise One, 59 ALA. LAw. 246 (1998); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love,
"Evaluative" Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31
(1996); John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each
Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 849-56 (1997); Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons
Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937 (1997); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute
Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871 (1997); Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules:
Is It Ethical for Mediators to Evaluate or Advise?, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 669 (1997);
Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques:
A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 23-24 (1996); James H. Stark, The
Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative Proposals,
from an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 769 (1997); Joseph B. Stulberg,
Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 985 (1997); Ellen A. Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate in
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article transcends that theoretical debate by analyzing the propriety of
evaluative mediation in terms of pertinent laws and by relating empirical
research regarding the prediction of case outcomes to the phenomenon of
case evaluation by mediators.
II. A PHILOSOPHICAL AND STYLISTIC DIFFERENCE: FACILITATIVE
VERSUS EVALUATIVE MEDIATION
Early in the ADR movement, mediation was being taught and largely
practiced in a form typically labeled "facilitative mediation." This approach
to mediation is based on the fundamental belief that disputants can work
together constructively if placed in a neutral, safe, and supportive
environment. Accordingly, the mediator's role is to facilitate such an
opportunity. Proponents of facilitative mediation believe that disputants, with
the aid of their own legal counsel, are capable of understanding their
situations better than third parties and therefore "can develop better solutions
than any the mediator might create." 2 Consequently, facilitative mediation
emphasizes assisting the disputants in evaluating their own situations rather
than evaluating the disputes for them. Thus, the facilitative mediator does not
give advice and does not provide opinions on the merits of arguments and the
relative value of the case. Nor does the facilitative mediator make predictions
about how a suit would likely be decided. Instead, the facilitative mediator
assists the parties in reaching a mutually agreeable resolution by enhancing
and clarifying communication, by reorienting efforts away from fighting in
support of positions and toward identification of true interests, and by
helping the disputants to identify and analyze their options.3 Moreover,
facilitative mediation offers a therapeutic approach to dispute resolution
because the outcome of facilitative mediation is an agreement based on
information and understanding rather than mediator influence or coercion. A
productive facilitative mediator will likely have considerable process
expertise. Substantive expertise can also be a valuable attribute for a
facilitative mediator, though it may be considered less critical.4
Mediation: Applying the Lens of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 82 MARQuETTE L. REv. 155
(1998).
2 See Stulberg, supra note 1, at 995 (summarizing an assertion made by Riskin,
supra note 1, at 24).
3 This facilitative approach to mediation is closely aligned with the process of
principled negotiation popularized by Roger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard
Negotiation Project. E.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING To YES (Bruce
Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION: A
WORKING GUIDE (1978).
4 Another distinguishable form of facilitative mediation is what is known as
"transformative mediation." This non-evaluative approach has roots in the 1970s related
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During the 1990s, there was an enormous growth in the use of mediation.
Much of this growth was the product of court referrals and orders. In this
adversarial setting, there arose a practice of "evaluative mediation" modeled
somewhat after judicial settlement conferences. The evaluative mediator is
more concerned with the parties' legal rights than with satisfying their
interests. Evaluative mediation is based on the fundamental belief that
disputants can benefit when a knowledgeable and objective third party
provides guidance about substantive issues and the merits of their positions.5
The evaluative mediator gives advice, makes assessments, renders opinions
on issues, and predicts outcomes-including expressing an opinion about
how a judge or jury would likely decide the case. As a part of this process,
the evaluative mediator usually devotes considerable time to impressing upon
the parties the weaknesses of their case and the cost of pursuing a litigated
resolution. The process is often adversarial throughout, with the mediator
pressing the disputants to make new demands and offers more in line with
the mediator's evaluations. Given this legal rights focus, it is common for
evaluative mediators to be lawyers or retired judges with considerable
substantive legal expertise.
In practice, however, many mediators combine aspects of facilitative and
evaluative mediation; thus, the philosophical and stylistic differences
between the two approaches is less distinct and instead represents more of a
continuum.6 In the plainest sense, all mediators are facilitators in that all are
assisting disputants in reaching settlements. In addition, evaluative mediators
often engage in practices normally associated with facilitative mediation.
Furthermore, even the staunchest facilitative mediator may utilize tools that
are somewhat evaluative or, at least, may be perceived as evaluative. For
example, while exploring attributes of the dispute the facilitative mediator
may create the perception that she has evaluated the merits of the case in a
to social concerns for empowerment of weaker parties. It has been brought to the
forefront in the 1990s through the book The Promise of Mediation. ROBERT A. BARUCH
BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (Jossey-Bass 1994).
Transformative mediation does not center on solving the immediate problem. Instead, the
focus is on personal development, interpersonal understanding, and transforming the
relationship of the disputing parties. The transformative mediator works to foster
empowerment and help each of the parties appreciate the other's needs, interests, values,
and points of view. Moreover, the foremost goal of transformative mediation is not the
generation of a mutually acceptable settlement of the immediate dispute. It is to enable
the parties to constructively approach their current and future problems in an enabled and
open-minded manner.
5 Stulberg, supra note 1, at 995 (summarizing an assertion made by Riskin, supra
note 1, at 24).
6 Samuel J. Imperati, Mediator Practice Models: The Intersection of Ethics and
Stylistic Practices in Mediation, 33 WILLAMErTE L. REV. 706 (1997) (reporting mediator
survey results).
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particular way because of the manner in which she asks the disputant probing
questions in such a manner as to create a perception on the part of a disputant
that the mediator has evaluated the merits of the case in a particular way.7
The evaluative mediator tends not to be critical of facilitative mediation,
other than to suggest that some mediations are settled more easily when the
disputants are provided an evaluation; thus, without an evaluation, settlement
can be delayed or an opportunity can be lost altogether. In the main,
however, criticism runs in the other direction, with the facilitative mediator
rejecting a role for evaluation in mediation. Thus, the debate centers on the
propriety of mediator involvement in evaluation.
Proponents of evaluative mediation assert that disputants help in
understanding the law and how their case is affected by the law, and that
lawyers want mediators to provide direction regarding appropriate settlement
figures. 8 Additionally, proponents claim that because settlement negotiation
takes place in the context of the alternative of litigation, the alternative
outcome is highly relevant and therefore evaluation should be considered a
valuable and proper component of mediation.9 Included within this group of
proponents are commentators who do not advocate evaluative mediation, per
se, but believe it should be available when chosen by the disputants. 10
Opponents of evaluative mediation counter that the tenor of the
mediation process changes dramatically when the mediator assumes an
evaluative role, 11 because evaluation reduces mediator impartiality and
disputant self-determination. 12 When the mediator interjects an opinion, the
disputant's ability to fashion a resolution based on their own needs is
compromised. Understanding that the mediator will be evaluative, the
disputant will not be as forthright with the mediator. A foremost goal will be
a favorable mediator evaluation, and a disputant will not be willing to share
information that could have an adverse effect on that evaluation. Under these
circumstances it is more likely that the mediator will not learn about
7 Hughes, supra note 1, at 248.
8 E.g., James H. Stark, Preliminary Reflections on the Establishment of a Mediation
Clinic, 2 CLINICAL L. REv. 457, 487 (1996). On a related note, sometimes attorneys
welcome mediator evaluations as an aid in addressing what may be referred to as a
"client control problem." The attorney anticipates that the mediator's evaluation will
confirm the attorney's own assessment of the case, and this will encourage an unrealistic
client to adjust expectations.
9 Bickerman, supra note 1, at 70.
10 John Lande, Stop Bickering! A Call For Collaboration, 16 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LrrxG. 1 (1998); Moberly, supra note 1, at 672-73, 678; Symposium,
Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1995 J. DISP.
kFSOL. 95, 101, 103 (1995) (comments by Professor Riskin).
11 E.g., Kovach & Love, supra note 1, at 31.
12 Love, supra note 1, at 939.
[Vol. 16:2 2001]
THE PROPRIETY OF EVALUATIVE MEDIATION
important information that could be relevant to assisting the disputants and
should be relevant to forming a valid evaluation.1 3 This is especially likely if
the mediation occurs at an early point in time prior to discovery. Evaluation
turns the process away from problem solving toward an adversarial contest-
sharing turns to posturing.' 4 Facilitative mediators view the potential for
sharing of information through mediation as a chief means to assist the
parties in recognizing opportunities to create new value and find win-win
solutions. Moreover, too much emphasis on a likely legal outcome overlooks
the possibility that the legal solution is not necessarily the best solution.
Critics also express concern about the directive and coercive nature of the
process when evaluation occurs. Some have gone so far as to characterize
evaluative mediators as "Rambo mediators" who are out to "knock some
sense" into the disputants by "banging their heads together" or "twisting their
arms.''15 Even if the evaluative mediator does not pressure, but merely
opines, it is hard to deny a preferential effect, for there is a natural tendency
to rely on the ideas, opinions, and predictions of the mediator.16 Undeniably,
any opinion or evaluation will favor one side and disfavor the other. One
may then ponder whether this influence is justified-whether the evaluative
mediator's evaluation is valid and proper.
I. THE LAW REGARDING MEDIATOR EVALUATIVE OPINIONS
All states have some statutory law regarding mediation. Often states
govern mediation by a lot of piecemeal legislation directed at a variety of
contexts-such as labor, family, school, farm, and public utility disputes.
Some states have a mediation statute that generally addresses mediation, or
certain aspects of mediation.17 However, a growing number of states address
mediation as part of a comprehensive alternative dispute resolution law.18 On
the other hand, some states only have arbitration statutes that include
1 Id. at 940.
14 See David B. Keller, Negotiatory Alchemy: The Court Special Master as Scientist
and Mediator, 13 NEGOTIATION J. 389, 395 (1997) (describing "the more evaluative and
narrow I became, the more receptive were the attorneys, since this played more to a
position-based distributive bargaining theme common to settlement conferences with
judges").
15 Lande, supra note 10, at 1.
16 Hughes, supra note 1, at 247.
17 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23C (West 2000); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5949 (West 2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.085 (West 2000).
18 E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-101 to -207 (Michie 1999); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 179.01-.04 (Anderson 1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.100-.558 (Supp. 1998);
TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.001-.073 (Vernon 2000).
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occasional provisions regarding mediation. 19 Finally, some states delegate
the legislation of rules for mediation to local courts. 20 Many of these laws
include definitions of mediation, but none are so restrictive as to rule out the
possibility of some evaluative function by the mediator. For example, the
Texas Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Act defines mediation as "a
forum in which an impartial person, the mediator, facilitates communication
between parties to promote reconciliation, settlement, or understanding
among them."21 Subsection b of this same statute adds, "A mediator may not
impose his own judgment on the issues for that of the parties." 22 If ,impose,,
means to force, then this would not seem to preclude the mere expression of
an evaluative opinion.
There is an effort underway to promote adoption of a uniform mediation
statute. The latest draft of the proposed Uniform Mediation Act defines
mediation as follows: "'Mediation' means a process in which a mediator
facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in
reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute. '23 Although the
proposed Uniform Mediation Act makes no reference to evaluative
mediation, in several places the accompanying notes acknowledge different
styles of mediation, including evaluative mediation. For example, addressing
the application and construction of the act, the notes discuss that the
disputants "can agree with the mediator on the general approach to
mediation, including whether the mediator will be evaluative or
facilitative." 24 Regarding the definition of mediation, the reporter comments
that "[t]he emphasis on negotiation in this definition is designed to exclude
adjudicative processes, not to distinguish among styles or approaches to
19 E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.014 (West 1992) (addressing the ability to subpoena
arbitrators).
20 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1907.262, 2303.202 (Anderson 1998 & Supp.
1999) (authorizing the court to collect reasonable fees for dispute resolution procedures).
21 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.023(a) (Vernon 2000).
22 Id. § 154.023(b).
23 UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 3(3) (Tentative Draft Feb. 2001), at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediatmed0220.htm. The February 2001 meeting was
the final meeting following four years of research and drafting. A final draft is expected
in May 2001. If approved by the conference in August 2001, it should be forwarded to
the ABA House of delegates for action in February 2002. E-mail from Nancy Rogers,
National Conference Reporter, Uniform Mediation Act, to Sherry Mowry, Managing
Editor, The Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution (March 19, 2001, 13:18:00 CST)
(on file with the Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution).
2 4 UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 2 reporter's working notes (Proposed Draft Nov.
2000) at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediatlmedllOO.htm. In referring to the
reporter's working notes, the proposed November 2000 draft will be cited because the
current February 2001 draft does not include the reporter's working notes.
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mediation." 25 And there is further comment that "[t]he use of the word
'facilitation' is not intended to express a preference with regard to
approaches of mediation. The Drafters recognize approaches to mediation
will vary widely." 26 Section 8 on "Disclosure by Mediator" states: "A
mediator shall disclose the mediator's qualifications to mediate a dispute, if
requested to do so by a party."27 The notes accompanying this section state:
The disclosure, upon request, of qualifications is a relatively novel
requirement. In some situations, the parties may make clear that they care
about the mediator's qualifications to conduct a particular approach to
mediation and would want to know whether the mediator in the past has
used a purely facilitative or instead an evaluative approach. 28
Also, the comments to the Prefatory Note describe the diversity of the
membership of the drafting committees, noting among, other things, they
include "strong proponents of both the evaluative and facilitative models of
mediation." 29 Moreover, it seems that the proposed Uniform Mediation Act
anticipates that mediation may proceed in an evaluative mode.
Some states have laws in the form of court or bar rules governing the
conduct of mediators that relate to the issue of the propriety of evaluative
mediation.30 These rules, standards, or codes of ethics, which are typically
promulgated by state dispute resolution commissions, describe the process of
mediation and the function and role of the mediator. While there is no
uniform set of rules among the states, there is considerable similarity in the
language of some of these standards. The similarity exists largely because the
drafters of these rules have been influenced by the Model Standards of
Conduct for Mediators ("Model Standards") which was prepared by a joint
committee of -the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration
25 Id. § 3(3) reporter's working notes.
26 Id.
2 7 UNIFORM MEDIATION AcT § 8(f) (Tentative Draft Feb. 2001), at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediatmed0220.htm. "Bracketed language in the text
refers to language that has been offered for discussion purposes only, and has not been
accepted into the Draft by the Drafting Committees." 1d.
28 UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 9(b) reporter's working notes (Proposed Draft Nov.
2000) at http:llwww.law.upenn.edulblllulc/mediatlmedl 100.htm.
29 ld. at comments to Prefatory Note.
30 E.g., IOWA R. OF CT., GOV. STANDARDS. OF PRAC. FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS IN
FAMILY DISPUrES R. 1-7. In some states, the elaboration of standards of conduct consists
simply of codes of associations. See Harry M. Webne-Behrman, The Emergence of
Ethical Codes and Standards of Practice in Mediation: The Current State of Affairs, 1998
WIS. L. REV. 1289 (focusing on guidelines of the Wisconsin Association of Mediators as
well as the evolution of mediation in Wisconsin).,
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Association, the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, and by the
early efforts of organizations such as the Center for Dispute Resolution
(CDR)31 and states such as Hawaii and Florida.32
These rules address matters such as the importance of self-determination,
mediator impartiality, and the role of professional advice-all of which have
relevance to the issue of the propriety of evaluative mediation. In the main,
however, these rules do not explicitly address this issue, and their effect on
evaluative mediation is therefore not entirely clear.
A. Self-Determination
Nearly all of these mediator rules place considerable emphasis on self-
determination in mediation. The Model Standards present self-determination
as the first standard:
Self-Determination: A Mediator Shall Recognize that Mediation is
Based on the Principle of Self-determination by the Parties.
Self-determination is the fundamental principle of mediation. It
requires that the mediation process rely upon the ability of the parties to
reach a voluntary, un-coerced agreement. Any party may withdraw from
mediation at any time.33
The Model Standards amplify each of the individual standards with
explanatory comments.34 Often state standards incorporate points addressed
in this commentary into their official rule.35
31 The CDR Code of Professional Conduct for Mediators was adopted by the
Colorado Council of Mediators in 1982. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION
PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 299 (1986).
32 For a historical overview, see generally KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 190-93 (1994).
3 3 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard I (American
Arbitration Ass'n et al. 1994).
34 Standard I is accompanied by the following comments:
The mediator may provide information about the process, raise issues, and help
parties explore options. The primary role of the mediator is to facilitate a voluntary
resolution of a dispute. Parties shall be given the opportunity to consider all
proposed options.
A mediator cannot personally ensure that each party has made a fully informed
choice to reach a particular agreement, but is a good practice for the mediator to
make the parties aware of the importance of consulting other professionals, where
appropriate, to help them make informed decisions.
Id. Standard I cmt.
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The standards accompanying Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 31 provide
a more detailed example. The Tennessee standard on "Self Determination"
reads as follows:
(a) Parties' Right to Decide. A mediator shall assist the parties in
reaching an informed and voluntary settlement. Decisions are to be made
voluntarily by the parties themselves.
(b) Prohibition of Mediator Coercion. A mediator shall not coerce or
unfairly influence a party into a settlement and shall not make substantive
decisions for any party to a mediation process.
(c) Prohibition of Misrepresentation. A mediator shall not intentionally
nor knowingly misrepresent material facts or circumstances in the course of
conducting a mediation.
(d) A Balanced Process. A mediator shall promote a balanced process
and shall encourage the parties to conduct the mediation deliberations in a
non-adversarial manner.
(e) Mutual Respect. A mediators shall promote mutual respect among
the parties throughout the mediation process. 36
One may question whether the practice of evaluative mediation is
consistent with these self-determination standards. There is a fine line
between facilitative influence and coercion. 37 In promoting mediation, it is
common for mediation service providers to emphasize high settlement rates.
In this environment, mediators are under considerable pressure to produce
settlements. Giving an evaluative opinion can easily become part of a
coercive effort to settle.
B. Impartiality
The second of the Model Standards addresses impartiality:
Impartiality: A Mediator Shall Conduct the Mediation in an
Impartial Manner.
3 5 E.g., KAN. RULES RELATING TO MEDIATION 903(a); MINN. GEN. RULES OFPRAC.
FOR THE DIST. COs. 114 app. Code of Ethics; N.C. STANDARDS OFPROF'L CONDUCr FOR
MEDIATORS Standard V (West 2000).
36 TENN. SUp. CT. R. 31 app. A(5).
3 7 Compare GA. ALTERNATIVE DIsP. RESOL. RULES app. C § A(I)D) ("The
mediator must guard against any coercion of parties in obtaining a settlement.") with
id. app. C § A(1)(E) commentary recommendation ("The line between information and
advice can be very difficult to find. However, failure to honor the maxim that a mediator
never offers professional advice can lead to an invasion of the parties' right to self-
determination and a real or perceived breach of neutrality.")
275
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The concept of mediator impartiality is central to the mediation
process. A mediator shall mediate only those matters in which she or he can
remain impartial and evenhanded. If at any time the mediator is unable to
conduct the process in an impartial manner, the mediator is obligated to
withdraw.3 8
Consider the Tennessee Standards again as an illustration of an actual
state rule.39 The standard on "Impartiality" provides the following:
(a) Impartiality. A mediator shall be impartial and advise all parties of
any circumstances bearing on possible bias, prejudice, or impartiality.
Impartiality means freedom from favoritism or bias in word, action, and
appearance. Impartiality implies a commitment to aid all parties, as opposed
to an individual party, in moving toward an agreement.
(1) A mediator shall maintain impartiality while raising questions for
the parties to consider as to the reality, fairness, equity, and feasibility of
proposed options for settlement.
(2)A mediator shall withdraw from mediation if the mediator believes
the he or she can no longer be impartial.
(3) A mediator shall not give or accept a gift, request, favor, loan, or
any other item of value to or from a party, attorney, or any other person
involved in and arising from any mediation process.4 0
Florida has recently completed a major revision of its Mediator
Standards. The following is the core provision of the new Florida rule on
"Impartiality": 4 1
38 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard II (American
Arbitration Ass'n et al. 1994).
39 For examples of other state rules pertaining to mediator impartiality, see ALA.
CODE OF ETHICS FOR MEDIATORS § ITl Standard 5; KAN. RULES RELATING TO MEDIATION
903(b); N.J. DIST. CT. Civ. R. 301.1(g)(1). Some of these state rules do little more than
express that the mediator has a duty to be impartial. E.g., GA. ALTERNATIVE DiSP. RESOL.
RULES app. C § A(m) ("A mediator must demonstrate impartiality in word and deed. A
mediator must scrupulously avoid any appearance of partiality.");
IDAHO R. CIv. P. 16(K)(9); N.C. STANDARDS OF PROF. CONDUCT Standard II (West
2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 37 app. A § B(2)(c) (West 1993).
40 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 31 app. A(6). This subsection also includes a paragraph (b)
addressing the topics of conflicts of interest, other entangling relationships, required
disclosures, and prohibitions regarding soliciting or providing counseling, therapy, legal,
or other professional services. Id. R. 31 app. A(6)(b). Conflict of interest is addressed in
Standard I of the Model Standards. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS
Standard III (American Arbitration Ass'n et al. 1994).
41 Similar to Tennessee, the Florida rule on impartiality also addresses mediator
withdrawal for failure to be impartial and a prohibition regarding the receipt of gifts and
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(a) Generally. A mediator shall maintain impartiality throughout the
mediation process. Impartiality means freedom from favoritism or bias in
word, action, or appearance, and includes a commitment to assist all parties,
as opposed to any one individual. 42
The accompanying comment states: "During the mediation, a mediator
shall maintain impartiality even while raising questions regarding the reality,
fairness, equity, durability and feasibility of proposed options for
settlement."43
Again, one may ponder the propriety of the practice of evaluative
mediation in regard to an impartiality standard. A mediator may come to the
mediation as an impartial third party, may proceed with an honest belief in
his or her ability to serve impartially, and may, operating in this impartial
mode, formulate a judgement about the merits of the case. The question then
becomes, can the mediator maintain impartiality if the mediator discloses his
or her evaluative assessment? Rendering an evaluative opinion may display a
lack of evenhandedness. It can be viewed as a display of favoritism both in
appearance and act. When a mediator formulates an opinion and then shares
that information with the disputing parties, this necessarily favors one party
over another, unless the mediator's evaluation lies precisely in the middle of
the parties' positions of impasse. And while an arbitrator or a neutral
evaluator can function impartially and render a decision or evaluative
opinion, the same is not true of mediation.
C. Giving Advice or Opinions
There is no standard within the Model Standards specifically directed to
the matter of giving advice or opinions. The comments to Standard VI do,
however, speak to this matter. Standard VI reads as follows:
Quality of the Process: A Mediator shall Conduct the Mediation
Fairly, Diligently, and in a Manner Consistent with the Principle of
Self-Determination by the Parties.
A mediator shall work to ensure a quality process and to encourage
mutual respect among the parties. A quality process requires a commitment
by the mediator to diligence and procedural fairness. There should be
adequate opportunity for each party in the mediation to participate in the
the solicitation of future services. FLA. RULEs OF CT. FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-
APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.330(b), (c).
42 Id. R. 10.330(a).
43 Id. R. 10.330(a) committee notes.
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discussions. The parties decide when and under what conditions they will
reach an agreement or terminate a mediation. 44
The Comments to this standard include the following statement:
The primary purpose of a mediator is to facilitate the parties' voluntary
agreement. This role differs substantially from other professional-client
relationships. Mixing the role of a mediator and the role of a professional
advising a client is problematic, and mediators must strive to distinguish
between the roles. A mediator should, therefore, refrain from providing
professional advice. Where appropriate, a mediator should recommend that
parties seek outside professional advice, or consider resolving their dispute
through arbitration, counseling, neutral evaluation, or other processes. A
mediator who undertakes, at the request of the parties, an additional dispute
resolution role in the same matter assumes increased responsibilities and
obligations that may be governed by the standards of other professions. 45
This comment implores the mediator to refrain from providing
professional advice. Some of the states have specifically incorporated such
'language in their standards (not just accompanying comments). 46 But what
exactly does "professional advice" include? Does it mean a psychologist-
mediator should not provide psychological counseling, and a lawyer-
mediator should not provide legal advice? Is it possible for a lawyer-mediator
to provide an evaluative opinion without providing legal advice? If this
means that lawyer-mediators are prohibited from providing legal advice, then
the lawyer-mediator must refrain from providing an evaluative opinion when
the opinion is based on the mediator's assessment of the law-as it would be
in most cases. This is further supported by the statement encouraging the
mediator to recommend outside professional advice, including arbitration and
neutral evaluation. Nonetheless, the final sentence of this comment certainly
contemplates that a mediator may undertake an additional role at the request
of the parties. Although, the above discussion points to the impropriety of
evaluative mediation, this is not a widely acknowledged interpretation of the
44 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard VI (American
Arbitration Ass'n et al. 1994).
45 Id. Standard VI cmt.; see also S.C. ALTERNATIVE DIsP. RESOL. app. B Standard
VI (including the identical language of both the Model Standard and the accompanying
comment).
46 E.g., GA. ALTERNATIVE DIsP. RESOL. RULES app. C § A(I)(E); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, ch. 37 app. A § B(2)(d)(1) (West 1993); see also KAN. RULES RELATING TO
MEDIATION app. § V(C) ("The mediator may define the legal issues, but shall not direct
the decision of the mediation participants based upon the mediator's interpretation of the
law as applied to the facts of the situation.").
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Model Standards. The drafting committee likely discussed the issue, but
chose not to take a clear stand on it.
Some states have addressed the matters of advice or opinions more
directly, especially the state of Florida. Florida first addressed the matter with
the 1992 adoption of the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed
Mediators. Old Rule 10.090(d) stated, "'While a mediator may point out
possible outcomes of the case, under no circumstances may a mediator offer
a personal or professional opinion as to how the court in which the case has
been filed will resolve the dispute."47 This rule seemed to allow for providing
information about an array of possible outcomes, but not for an opinion about
a most likely outcome. Additionally, it transcended the more common
prohibition of professional advice by prohibiting a personal opinion.
Professor Robert Moberly has written, however, that this language did not
prohibit evaluation, pointing to the fact that "there was no discussion to that
effect when the code was drafted. '48 Moberly rationalized the rule as being
adopted to "prohibit tactics that imply some special knowledge of how a
particular judge will rule."49 Though possibly true to the intention of the
drafters, this seems an extraordinarily narrow reading contrary to the plain
meaning of this language.
Mediator evaluation has been the subject of one Florida Advisory Ethics
opinion.50 The matter, however, did not involve a challenge to a mediator
who engaged in case evaluation; instead, it involved an advertisement
promoting mediator evaluation. The advertisement included the following
statement: "When the survival of your client's case requires a dispassionate
evaluation by a neutral, consider the benefits of an early mediation. '51 The
ethics panel concluded that the description of mediation as a dispassionate
evaluation constituted a violation of the advertising rule because the rule
required mediators represent their services honestly and make only accurate
statements about mediation.52 The panel noted that mediation is different
from early neutral evaluation, and it "is misleading for mediators to advertise
that they are providing evaluation services under the guise of mediation
services." 53 Here, too, Moberly has provided a narrow interpretation of
events. He has asserted that although this opinion establishes that Florida
4 7 FLA. RULES OF CT. FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.090(d)
(West 1992) (repealed 2000).
4 8 Robert B. Moberly, Ethical Standards for Court-Appointed Mediators and
Florida's Mandatory Mediation Experiment, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 701,715 (1994).
49 Id.
50 Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Board, Ethics Op. 95-007 (1995).
51 Id.
5 2 FLA. RULES OF CT. FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.130.
5 3 Ethics Op. 95-007, supra note 50.
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mediators cannot call evaluation "mediation," and cannot advertise that they
provide evaluation in mediation, this does not mean that they are prohibited
from evaluating. 54 In Moberly's view, mediator evaluation should be
permitted so long as it is not "coercive or harmful," in which case "the
protections against violating principles of self-determination and impartiality
are sufficient to protect the parties." 55
After considerable debate and discussion, the Florida rule was revised
last year with the adoption of the new Rule 10.370. This rule, entitled
"Professional Advice Or Opinions," reads in its entirety as follows:
(a) Providing Information. Consistent with standards of impartiality
and preserving party self-determination, a mediator may provide
information that the mediator is qualified by training or experience to
provide.
(b) Independent Legal Advice. When a mediator believes a party does
not understand or appreciate how an agreement may adversely affect legal
rights or obligations, the mediator shall advise the party of the right to seek
independent legal counsel.
(c) Personal or Professional Opinion. A mediator shall not offer a
personal or professional opinion intended to coerce the parties, decide the
dispute, or direct a resolution of any issue. Consistent with standards of
impartiality and preserving party self-determination however, a mediator
may point out possible outcomes of the case and discuss the merits of a
claim or defense. A mediator shall not offer a personal or professional
opinion as to how the court in which the case has been filed will resolve the
dispute.56
Subsection (a) of Rule 10.370 allows a mediator to provide expert
information, which would seem to include legal advice, provided the
mediator advises of the right to independent legal counsel as required by
subsection (b). Subsection (c) of Rule 10.370 provides a bit more direction
than the old Rule 10.090(d), which it replaces. The new first sentence
prohibits offering opinions that are "intended to coerce the parties, decide the
dispute, or direct a resolution of any issue."'57 One can infer that opinions
offered without such an intent would be appropriate. One must wonder,
however, how this intent can be discerned. The second sentence of
§ 10.370(c) amplifies the former statement that a mediator "may point out
possible outcomes of the case" by indicating this is "consistent with
standards of impartiality and preserving party self-determination," and that a
54 Moberly, supra note 1, at 673.
55 id. at 675, 678.
5 6 FLA. RULES OF CT. FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.370(c).
57 Id.
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mediator may also "discuss the merits of a claim or defense. '58 The final
sentence continues to include the prohibition on offering a personal or
professional opinion about how the court in which the case has been filed
will resolve the dispute.
The Florida Supreme Court offered some comments in connection with
its adoption of new Rule 10.370. The court explained:
Under subdivisions (a) and (c), if impartiality is maintained and the parties'
rights to self-determination are preserved, a rmediator may provide
information that the mediator is qualified to give, point out possible
outcomes and discuss the merits of a claim or defense. With the basic tenets
of the rule in mind, personal opinions intended to coerce the parties, decide
the dispute, or direct a resolution are prohibited.59
Professor Gregory Firestone urged the court not to adopt this rule,
expressing concern that the rule blurs the distinction between arbitration and
mediation; specifically, the rule would cause family and dependency
mediation to become too adversarial. Noting the "substantial controversy"
and two year history of hearings and debate concerning the propriety of
evaluative mediation, the court dismissed Firestone's objection by deferring
to the expertise of the committee in charge of drafting the rules. 60 The court
did, however, acquiesce to another of Firestone's critical comments.
Firestone objected to the reference to the mediator as an "impartial third
person" in the new definitional rule 10.210, rather than a "neutral third
person" as used in the Florida statutes.61 To avoid confusion that could be
caused by the use of the differing terminology, the court modified rule
10.210 to refer to a "neutral and impartial third person." The court explained
that by using the term impartial the intent was to curtail a mediator's
tendency to interject his or her beliefs about how the subject of the mediation
should be resolved, thereby protecting the parties' right of self-determination.
The court explained, according to the Committee, the rules were in fact
intended to promote exactly what Firestone urged they should-a "neutral
role with regard to the outcome of a dispute." 62
The Florida court's opinion regarding the amendments to the Rules for
Certified and Court Appointed Mediators is confounding. The court stressed
58 Id.
59 In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules for Certified & Court-Appointed Mediators,
762 So. 2d 441, 444 (Fla. 2000).
6 0 Id. at 445 ("We decline to second guess the Committee's decision that this
mediation technique should be recognized in the rules.").
61 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.1011(2) (West 1999) (emphasis added).
6 2 In re Amendments, 762 So. 2d at 442.
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that personal opinions that are "intended to coerce" are prohibited, conveying
the notion that, otherwise, opinions are acceptable. And the court curtly
dismissed Firestone's objection that the amendments permitted a more
adjudicative role for mediators. Yet the court acknowledged the need for
mediator impartiality and, thus, the need "to curtail a mediator's tendency to
interject his or her beliefs about how the subject of the mediation should be
resolved, thereby protecting the parties' right of self-determination-the
guiding principle of mediation." 63 This latter quote points to a total
prohibition of the rendering of opinions by mediators.
While the elaboration of new Rule 10.370(c) may suggest a greater
receptiveness to evaluative opinions than previously, the Florida rule still
seems susceptible to multiple interpretations. A conservative read would
suggest that a mediator should do no more than identify an array of possible
outcomes and discuss the merits of the case in a non-evaluative way. In
contrast, a more liberal interpretation 64 would permit all evaluative feedback
short of enunciating a specific prediction about how the court will resolve the
matter, so long as it was offered without coercive intent.
A few other states have also addressed the topic of the rendering of
opinions by mediators. Section 8 of the standards accompanying Tennessee
Supreme Court Rule 31, which is entitled "Professional Advice," is very
similar to Florida Rule 10.370. Tennessee's section 8(a) states: "A mediator
shall not provide information the mediator is not qualified by training or
experience to provide. '65 The Florida rule expressed the same thought in the
form of a permissive statement. 66 Tennessee's section 8(b) on "Independent
Legal Advice" directs the mediator to "advise the participants to seek
independent legal counsel";67 in Florida the mediator is to advise "of the
right to seek independent legal counsel. ' 68 And, most on point, section 8(d)
entitled "Personal Opinion" states: "While a mediator may point out possible
outcomes of the case, a mediator should not offer a firm opinion as to how
the court in which the case has been filed will resolve the dispute. '69 The
Tennessee standard substitutes "should not" for the Florida "shall not" and
"firm opinion" for "personal or professional opinion." 70 Giving regard to
63 Id.
64 See supra itext accompanying note 55.
65 TENN. S. CT. R. 31 app. A(8)(a).
6 6 FLA. RULES OF CT. FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.370(a)
("[A] mediator may provide information that the mediator is qualified by training or
experience to provide.").
67 TENN. S. CT. R. 31 app. A(8)(b).
6 8 FLA. RULES OF CT. FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.370(b).
69 TENN. S. CT. R. 31 app. A(8)(d) (emphasis added).
7 0 FLA. RULES OF CT. FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.370(b).
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these subtle differences in wording, it appears that the Tennessee standard
expresses a less emphatic and narrower prohibition. One can surmise that the
"firm opinion" reference signifies a confident prediction of a very specific
outcome. If this is so, then a mediator could safely opine a range of
outcomes, perhaps even a fairly narrow range, or perhaps predict a specific
outcome, qualified with some degree of uncertainty.
The North Carolina Standards of Professional Conduct for Mediators
includes specific language regarding giving opinions or advice. Standard VI,
entitled "Separation of Mediation from Legal and Other Professional
Advice," directs that a mediator "limit himself solely to the role of mediator"
and "not provide legal or other professional advice whether in response to
statements or questions by the parties or otherwise."71 The standard on
"Consent" states, among other things, "[a] mediator shall not exert undue
pressure on a participant, whether to participate in mediation or to accept a
settlement .... -"72 The North Carolina standard on "Self Determination"
begins with the statement "[a] mediator shall respect and encourage self-
determination by the parties ... and shall refrain from being directive and
judgmental regarding the issues in dispute and options for settlement." 73 This
standard further states that a mediator "shall not impose his judgment for that
of the parties concerning any aspect of the mediation," 74 and shall not
"express an opinion about or advise for or against any proposal under
consideration. '75 Based on the collective language of these provisions, one
could infer that it would be improper for a mediator to render an evaluative
opinion, especially once any settlement offer or demand has been made.
Although the North Carolina Standards do not expressly address the
propriety of the evaluative style of mediation, it clearly portrays the mediator
as a questioner and maker of suggestions, and not an adviser and opinion
giver. The North Carolina Standards clearly treat mediation as a non-
judgmental, facilitative process. This is further reflected in Standard I
regarding "Competency." This standard describes mediator qualifications in
a manner recognizing that many mediators will not be qualified to serve as
case evaluators and identifies the mediator's most important qualification as
"competence in procedural aspects of facilitating the resolution of disputes
rather than the mediator's familiarity' with technical knowledge relating to
the subject of the dispute." 76
71 N.C. STANDARDS OF PROF. CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard VI (second bold
emphasis omitted).
7 2 Id. Standard IV(B).
73 Id. Standard V introductory cmt. (bold emphasis omitted).
74 Id. Standard V(A).
7 5 Id. Standard V(B).
76 Id. Standard I(A).
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The Minnesota ADR Code of Ethics does not specifically address
mediator evaluative opinions, but the evolution of the language of the official
comment to the one rule specifically written for mediators suggests a lack of
enthusiasm for the practice. The Minnesota code, which is directed generally
to alternative dispute resolution practitioners, includes one separate rule for
mediators regarding "Self-Determination. ' 77 This rule, which is very similar
to the Model Standard, is accompanied by the following comment:
The mediator may provide information about the process, raise issues, offer
opinions about the strengths and weaknesses of a case, draft proposals, and
help parties explore options. The primary role of the mediator is to facilitate
a voluntary resolution of a dispute. Parties should be given the opportunity
to consider all proposed options. It is acceptable for the mediator to suggest
options in response to parties' requests, but not to coerce the parties to
accept any particular option. 78
An earlier Advisory Task Force draft version of the comment to this
same rule included the following final sentence: "It is acceptable for the
mediator to suggest options or to offer opinions about the case, in response to
parties' requests for such options or opinions."79 Because of the difference in
wording in the final sentence, the current version, unlike the earlier draft,
does not convey a message of approval for mediator opinions.
In a small number of states there is some positive authority for evaluative
opinions. The Alabama Code of Ethics for Mediators endorses, under limited
circumstances, practices that would be associated with evaluative mediation.
The Alabama standard on "Professional Advice" prohibits a mediator from
offering "a personal or professional opinion regarding the likelihood of any
specific outcome except in the presence of the attorney for the party to whom
the opinion is given." 80 Thus, evaluative mediation is appropriate if the
77 MINN. GEN. RuLES OF PRAC. FOR THE DIST. CTS. 114 app. Code of Ethics R. 1
(West 2001). This rule reads as follows:
A mediator shall recognize that mediation is based on the principle of self-
determination by the parties. It requires that the mediation process rely upon the
ability of the parties to reach a voluntary, uncoerced agreement. The primary
responsibility for the resolution of a dispute and the shaping of a settlement
agreement rests with the parties. A mediator shall not require a party to stay in the
mediation against the party's will.
Id.
78 Id. R. 114 app. Code of Ethics R. 1 advisory task force comment n.1.
79 Minnesota Supreme Court ADR Review Board, Draft Rule 114 Code of Ethics,
http://www.finance-commerce.com/COURT/opinions/062196/81-1206a.htm (June 5,
1996).
8 0 ALA. CODE OF ETHICS FOR MEDIATORS § II Standard 7(d).
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parties have legal counsel present; otherwise it is not. Although California
does not have a law establishing statewide standards of conduct for
mediators, the California Dispute Resolution Council, an organization of
mediators, arbitrators, and other neutral dispute resolvers, has promulgated a
set of Standards of Practice for California Mediators. This document includes
the following statement: "A Mediator may generally discuss a party's options
including a range of possible outcomes in an adjudicative process. At the
parties' request, a Mediator may offer a personal evaluation or opinion of a
set of facts as presented, which should be clearly identified as such. 81
The Virginia Standards of Ethics and Professional Responsibility for
Certified Mediators contemplates different styles of mediation and calls for a
preliminary agreement about the mediation style to be used. Like many other
mediation standards, the Virginia Standards direct the mediator to describe
the mediation process to the parties at the outset. It, however, specifically
calls upon the mediator to "describe his style and approach to mediation." 82
The parties are to be given an opportunity to express their expectations
regarding the conduct of the mediation process, and then the parties and the
mediator are to include a general statement regarding the mediator's style
and approach to mediation to which the parties have stipulated in their
agreement to mediate. This is a curious allusion to mediation style, however,
in that there is no further delineation of what is meant by this reference, and
other provisions of the Virginia Standards include language regarding self-
determination and impartiality-language that is common to other mediator
standards and is strongly suggestive that mediators should not render
evaluative opinions. The only specific reference to advice by the mediator is
a required written notice that "[t]he mediator does not provide legal
advice."'83 The mediator is to encourage the participants to "obtain
independent expert information and/or advice... ."84 Furthermore, a
standard entitled "Professional Information" allows for the giving of
information "only in those areas where qualified by training or experience." 85
And the mediator is to provide the information "in a manner that will neither
affect the parties' perception of the mediator's impartiality, nor the parties'
self-determination. '86 Moreover, as with other states' rules on mediation
practices, the Virginia Standards convey a mixed message.
81 CDRC STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR CALIFORNIA MEDIATORS 3 (1999).
8 2 VA. STANDARDS OF ETHICS & PROF'L RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CERTIFIED
MEDIATORS D(1)(c) (1997).
83 Id. D(2)(a)(1).
8 4 Id. F(1).
85 Id. F(2).
86 Id. F(3).
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The effect of failing to comply with mediator standards of conduct is
quite limited. Most of the existing rules and standards are either silent on the
matter of non-compliance or generally indicate that the standards are
intended simply to guide the conduct of mediators. 87 The Alabama Code of
Ethics for Mediators explicitly indicates that violation of a standard neither
gives rise to a cause of action against the mediator nor signifies a breach of a
substantive duty by the mediator.88 The Alabama Code does provide that
failure to comply may serve as the basis for removal from the roster of
mediators.89 The Florida rule establishes a detailed hearing process for the
handling of charges of non-compliance, and it provides for sanctions such as
oral admonishment, written reprimand, additional training, suspension from
the practice of mediation or decertification. 90 Furthermore, the court rules
establishing standards of conduct for mediators would ordinarily apply only
to court-annexed mediation.91
The majority of states have no law relating to the issue of the propriety of
evaluative mediation. In the small number of states that have mediator rules
and standards regarding self-determination, impartiality, and the giving of
advice and opinions, the language of these provisions and the associated
explanatory comments seem to put in question the propriety of evaluative
mediation. This is all quite speculative, however, as no rule explicitly
prohibits evaluative mediation, and there is no decisional authority to that
effect. Some rules, such as those in North Carolina, seem to overwhelmingly
oppose evaluative functions. Others, such as Alabama, are accepting of
evaluation in limited circumstances. For the most part, the incipient law
regarding mediator practices displays considerable ambivalence, neither
definitively approving nor disapproving of the practice.
IV. THE QUALITY OF EVALUATIVE MEDIATION:
PREDICTING CASE OUTCOMES
Evaluation by disputing parties and their advisors occurs throughout the
dispute process. It is an integral part of dispute resolution. If mediators are to
engage in an evaluative function, a fundamental question concerns the ability
of mediators to meaningfully predict case outcomes. The predictability of a
87 E.g., KAN. RULES RELATING TO MEDIATION 903 (indicating rules are "guide to
conduct"); TENN. Sup. CT. R. 31 app. A(1)(a) (indicating that rules are guide to conduct);
VA. STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND PROF'L REsP. FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS A (1997).
88 ALA. CODE OF ETHICS FOR MEDIATORS § I.
89 Id.
9 0 FLA. RULES OF CT. FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.820,
10.83.
91 See, e.g., TENN. SUP. CT. R. 31 app. A(1)(a).
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case outcome is a function of many factors, and predictability varies under
different circumstances and on a case-by-case basis. The limited nature of the
mediators' involvement and the highly unpredictable nature of many cases
that are submitted to mediation give cause for concern about the validity of
evaluation by mediators.
First, one may question evaluative validity on grounds of insufficient
mediator familiarity and understanding. Disputing is a complicated
phenomenon, and disputes that are submitted to mediation are apt to be
among the more complex. The problem is that for many mediations mediator
involvement can be extremely limited. Sometimes mediators come to a
mediation in almost complete ignorance, having been presented with no
advance information about the dispute other than the identity of the parties.
Some mediators actually seem to prefer this approach. A great many
mediations consist of a one time meeting that may last just a few hours. This
is probably the norm for settlement conference type mediations. Thus it is
common for mediators to have a relatively superficial understanding of the
case. Moreover, in many cases, although the disputing parties may think of
the mediator as some sort of expert evaluator, in actuality, the mediator may
be poorly positioned to render an evaluation.92
Second, one may question evaluative validity because of the highly
unpredictable nature of the dispute. Some case outcomes are fairly easy to
predict; others are much more difficult. One can surmise that the more
difficult cases tend to be the ones that make their way to mediation.
Normally, efforts at outcome prediction will come well in advance of
mediation. In the first instance, the parties, at a minimum, sense that they
have a potential meritorious claim. Next, the attorneys for the respective
disputing parties will each commence to evaluate the case. For example, in
considering representation, the plaintiff's attorney will evaluate the
opportunities for success. If the attorney feels the case lacks merit, or at best
is a very weak one, the attorney may decline representation and advise the
party against pursuing the matter. The attorney may find it necessary to
gather additional information and perform preliminary research to assist in
making this initial determination. Once a formal engagement has occurred,
the opportunities for learning the facts of the case and understanding the
relevant law will improve, and the attorney will continually evaluate the
prospects for success and counsel the client accordingly. The attorney may
seek evaluative input from associates and various experts, and if the
adversarial posturing suggests widely divergent views, the attorney may even
92 Hughes, supra note 1, at 247 ("[Disputants] have lived with the dispute for
months, if not years, have slept on it, sweated over it, and cried about it. The mediator
has, at most, a few hours of exposure to the dispute and cannot be expected to know more
than the parties.").
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retain independent counsel to provide an evaluative opinion. Cases that are
more susceptible to accurate outcome predictions will result in more
consistent attorney evaluations. These relatively straight forward cases will
be able to settle without the aid of a mediator.93 On the other hand, cases
involving more uncertain outcomes are more likely to produce differing
views of worth among the partisan evaluators and will likely travel further
down the path toward an adjudicated decision. It is these harder to predict
cases that comprise a high percentage of the cases that are submitted to
mediation. It is under these circumstances of greater uncertainty, that the
mediator's case evaluation is of more questionable validity. In other words,
the highly contested case by its nature is not susceptible of a high probability
assessment of outcome.94 Remarkably, I was unable to identify any research
that specifically addressed the ability of evaluative mediators to accurately
predict case outcomes. Data is available, however, that displays the difficulty
of predicting litigation outcomes-giving cause for concern about the quality
of evaluative opinions by mediators.
Consider Professor Gerald Williams' studies of lawyer negotiating
skills.95 In one project, Williams conducted an experiment involving forty
practicing lawyers in Des Moines, Iowa. Williams posed the question: "[I]f a
number of experienced lawyers were paired against each other and assigned
to undertake settlement negotiations on identical cases, would the resulting
93 This is true unless the parties are in search of a creative or "healing" solution. For
example, mediation is often the ADR procedure of choice when the disputants will have
some future relationship. A facilitative or transformative mediator may appropriately aid
in this pursuit. Under these circumstances, there is little reason to involve a mediator in
case evaluation.
94 That is not to say that there is no place for evaluation under conditions of
considerable uncertainty. To the contrary, quantitative decision making analysis
involving an expected value determination can be meaningful. See Marjorie Corman
Aaron, The Value of Decision Analysis in Mediation Practice, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 123
(1995); Samuel Bodily, When Should You Go to Court?, HARv. Bus. REv., May-June
1981, at 103; George J. Siedel, The Decision Tree: A Method to Figure Litigation Risks,
B. LEADER, Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 18; Marc B. Victor, The Proper Use of Decision Analysis
to Assist Litigation Strategy, 40 Bus. LAW. 617 (1985). This approach is most relevant,
however, for repeat players (i.e., those who are frequently prosecuting or defending
lawsuits) or those who, at least, have a broader perspective than just the dispute at hand.
By using decision tree analysis and proceeding to settlement on the basis of an expected
value calculation one can theoretically optimize decision making over the long term. It
would seem that evaluation under conditions of considerable uncertainty might, therefore,
make sense if the mediator is a decision science practitioner and the party understands the
utility of decision science analysis. With the present state of affairs, neither of these
conditions pertain for most mediations.
95 GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 5-7, 110-14
(1983).
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settlements be substantially identical, or would there be considerable
variations in the dollar value of the outcomes?" 96 Williams divided the
lawyers into twenty pairs for negotiation of the same personal injury case
(half representing plaintiffs and half representing defendants). 97 The lawyers
were presented with identical case files and historical data on jury verdicts
from the court in which the case would be tried, and were given two weeks
lead time to prepare for their settlement negotiation.98 As an incentive for
serious involvement, participating lawyers were told that the results of the
negotiations would be published with the attorneys' names included (thereby
putting their professional reputations at stake).99 At the conclusion of these
settlement negotiations, information was assembled regarding opening offers
or demands and final outcomes. 100 In the end, only fourteen of the twenty
pairs willingly submitted their results. 10 1 Williams describes the results as
"sobering."102 The settlement outcomes ranged from a high of $95,000 to a
low of $15,000, with the remainder of the outcomes scattered almost
randomly between the two extremes. 10 3 Williams reports, "It is apparent that
there were dramatic differences not only in the perceptions these lawyers had
about the 'value' of the case, but in the persuasiveness or skill with which
they pursued their objectives."104 Williams further recounts how after he
announced the results at a meeting of the participants the participants all
argued that they had accurately valued the case and that it was the others
were mistaken. 105 Although Williams was attempting to draw conclusions
about lawyer negotiation skills, his experiment provides a provocative
database suggesting the difficulty of case evaluation.
Another study displaying the difficulty that lawyers have in assessing
case values is that of Douglas Rosenthal. 10 6 This researcher picked sixty-one
personal injury cases that had been settled in New York. 107 He then selected
96 Id. at 5.
97 Id. at 6.
98 Id.
99 Id.
10 0 Id. at 6-7.
101 Id. at 6.
10 2 Id. at6.
103 Id.
104Id
105 Videotape: Competitive & Cooperative Modes of Negotiating (Harvard Law
School Program on Negotiation 1986) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
106 DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (Russell
Sage Foundation 1974).
107 Id. at 29.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
five experts to independently review the actual case files. 10 8 Two of the
evaluators were experienced plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers, one other
had twenty-five years experience as a plaintiffs' lawyer and had recently
begun doing insurance defense work, another was an experienced insurance
defense lawyer, and the last was an experienced insurance claims adjuster.' 09
For each case, Rosenthal reported six case values (the five evaluative
opinions and the actual settlement value), the evaluative mean, and a
coefficient of variability."l 0 The variations among the case values for a case
were dramatic. For example, case number 53, which settled for $25,000,
generated an evaluation mean of $10,000; individual evaluations of $2,500,
$3,000, $7,500, $12,000, and $25,000; and a coefficient of variability of
0.9226. Another typical example was case number 2, which settled for
$3,500, and generated an evaluation mean of $21,500; individual evaluations
of $7,500, $17,500, $20,000, $22,500, and $40,000; and a coefficient of
variability of 0.5490.111
Jury Verdict Research, Inc. (JVR) has compiled considerable data
regarding offers, demands, and jury verdicts. Phillip Hermann has analyzed
sets of this data considering the question: "[h]ow good are lawyers and
insurance companies at predicting verdicts?" 112 Hermann posits that final
offers and demands are the best measurement of how well the bargaining
iepresentatives predict verdict outcomes. 113 As one would expect, most of
the final demands (in one study 61%) exceeded the actual verdicts, and most
of the final offers (70%) were lower than the verdicts. 114 Yet Hermann found
that overwhelmingly these demands and offers were not close to the ultimate
verdicts. 115 Only 18.43% of the demands and only 16.67% of the final offers
fell within a range 25% above or below the ultimate verdict.116 For this data
set, the median demand was $50,000, the median offer was $15,000, and the
median verdict was $35,000.117 Hermann had similar findings in another
study regarding back and neck injury claims-only one in six final demands
108 /d. at 37.
109 Id.
110 Id.
I Id. at 204-05. The individual evaluator scores are listed here by order of dollar
magnitude, not by evaluator.
112 1 PHILIP J. HERMANN, BETTER, EARLIER SETTLEMENTS THROUGH ECONOMIC
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and final offers fell within 25% of the ultimate verdicts. 118 Hermann
observed that the disparity between these demands and offers was
particularly striking because back and neck injury claims are among those
most frequently seen by attorneys and adjusters, and the verdicts should
therefore be relatively easy to predict.119 From these studies, Hermann has
concluded that most tort trial attorneys and claims adjusters are not very
good at predicting jury verdicts.120 Hermann has also explained how one can
be a better predictor by systematically analyzing verdict statistics available
from JVR. 121 Hermann referred to research comparisons of verdict
expectancy figures and actual verdicts that show the validity of this valuation
method.122 He also appropriately emphasized that verdict analysis is based
on probabilities and "[n]o one can say exactly what a specific jury will do";
researchers can only "estimate the probable outcome of a case based on
specific case facts and the observed effect of those facts on past cases." 123
Data from studies using multiple mock juries also provide reason to
question the ability of a mediator to meaningfully evaluate a case. For
example, Professors Liebman, Bennett and Fetter utilized a large number of
mock jury panels in their study of the effect of jury instructions regarding
118 Id.
119 One would expect predictions to be even wider ranging in more complex cases.
Cf. Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 373, 393 (1991)
(explaining why simple tort cases are not an adequate paradigm for litigation).
120 Observe that Hermann's study included only cases that did not settle. If the
opposing representatives had reached similar evaluative conclusions about a case, the
case would have settled and would not have been included in this database. Because of
this, one may question Hermann's conclusion to the extent that it is intended to suggest
that lawyers and adjusters, in general, are not very accomplished at evaluating cases.
Nevertheless, Hermann's analysis is suggestive of the difficulty of case valuation for
cases that do not settle. And cases that are submitted to mediation are more likely to
consist of these tougher, non-settled cases. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
Also, there are other possible explanations for the seemingly poor predictive
evaluations represented by the offers and demands. For example, it is also possible that a
party may have accurately evaluated the case, but due to other factors, may have decided
not to reveal this in the final offer. One side may have viewed a totally unrealistic
demand from the adversary as not worthy of a response reflective of a sound evaluation
of the case. See HERMANN, supra note 112, §§ 2.03-.04 (discussing, among other things,
how negotiators get caught up in the negotiation ritual). Although, it would seem
advisable to share a well grounded assessment of the value of the case with one's
adversary. Indeed mediators often encourage disputants to do just that.
121 HERMANN, supra note 112, § 3.00.
122 Id. §§ 3.02.01, 3.03; see also Phillip J. Hermann, Predicting Personal Injury
Verdicts and Damages, in 6 AM. JUR. TRIALS 963, 963-89 (1967).
123 HERMANN, supra note 112, § 3.04.
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comparative fault laws. 124 They presented the mock juries with a trial
simulation case based on a real trial. An accident victim sues a truck driver
(allegedly negligent operation of the vehicle) and the state (allegedly
negligent signage or intersection design). The defendants deny their own
negligence, argue negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and dispute the
amount of the claimed damage. The simulations involved the use of an
approximately four hour long video presentation of the case. 125 The
researchers presented different mock jury panels with different jury
instructions, and then looked for differences in the final outcome based on
the different instructions. One set of jury panels was not informed of the
legal consequences of the percentage bar to plaintiffs recovery under a
modified comparative fault rule (the "blindfold" approach). 126 The other set
of jury panels was informed (the "sunshine" approach). 127 In the main, these
researchers did not find a statistically significant effect on the ultimate
damage awards. While it was not a matter under study, the data generated
from these many mock jury panels reveals widely varying verdicts from
different mock jury panels deliberating with respect to the exact same case
presentation. 128 The researchers report thirty-nine separate mock jury
verdicts rendered under the blindfold instruction scenario.129 Prior to
adjusting for the modified comparative fault rule, these verdicts range from a
high of $6,030,000 to a low of zero.130 In all, three mock juries rendered
defendants' verdicts, awarding nothing to the plaintiff.13' The mean and
median awards for plaintiff were $1,414,629 and $740,000, respectively; and
the standard deviation was $1,456,807.132 Then these verdicts were adjusted,
taking into account the modified comparative fault rule. 133 Thus, all verdicts
for cases in which the jury determined that the plaintiff was more than fifty
percent at fault were changed to defendants' verdicts. This produced twenty-
four new defendants' verdicts (in addition to the three that still stood). 134
After taking into account the modified comparative fault rule, the thirty-nine
124 See generally Jordan H. Leibman et al., The Effect of Lifting the Blindfold from
Civil Juries Charged with Apportioning Damages in Modified Comparative Fault Cases:
An Empirical Study of the Alternatives, 35 AM. BUS. L. J. 349 (1998).
125 Id. at 381.
126 Id. at 375, 381.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 386-88 tbls.l-i.129 Id. at 3 86-87 tbls.l1-2.
130 Id. at 386 tbl.1, col.11.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 387 tbl.2.
134 Id. at 387 tbl.2, col.1 1.
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verdicts ranged from a high $6,030,000 to a low of zero, with a mean verdict
amount of $973,622, a median amount of zero, and a standard deviation of
$1,619,631.135 The researchers report forty-five separate mock jury verdicts
rendered under the sunshine instruction scenario.136 These verdicts range
from a high of $7,000,000 to a low of zero.137 In all, there were twenty-six
defendants' verdicts and two hung juries. 138 The mean and median awards
for plaintiff were $1,029,186 and zero, respectively; and the standard
deviation was $1,774,573.139 How can a mediator meaningfully predict the
outcome of such a case other than to express the potential for a wide range of
outcomes? If the mediator chooses to do otherwise, the prediction is
fallacious.
I have also conducted experiments with multiple mock juries that have
rendered similarly widely divergent verdicts. An earlier publication detailed
the treatment of an identical case by seventy-five different jury panels.140
This trial simulation involved a suit by customers (three brothers) against a
business for false imprisonment, assault, and infliction of emotional distress.
The customers claimed they had been wrongfully detained for suspected
theft. The defendant denied the impropriety of the detention and disputed the
amount of claimed damages. The seventy-five jury verdicts range from a
high of $2,930,000 to a low of zero, with a mean verdict amount of $71,980,
a median of $20,000, and a standard deviation of $345,422. This data set did
include two outlying verdicts, the high of $2,930,000 and a second verdict of
$750,000. At the other extreme, there was one hung jury, one defendant's
verdict and one verdict for only $1.00. Nevertheless, the remaining seventy
verdicts are fairly evenly spread across a range from roughly $2,000 up to
$100,000.141 Again, with such results, one must question the validity of any
attempt to opine on the specific value of the case.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 388 tbl.3.
137 Id. at 388 tbl.3, col.11.
138 I.
139 Id.
14 0 Murray S. Levin, L_;arning About the Unpredictability of Litigation Through a
Mock Jury Exercise, 16 3. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 271 (1998).
141 Id. at 295-96 tbl.2. This case was complicated by a claim for punitive damages.
Yet, if one simply focuses on the compensatory damages portion of the verdicts, the
results remain quite dispersed. The mean award was $3,601; the median $300; and the
standard deviation was $7,051.
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V. CONCLUSION
There is a degree of confusion about the meaning of the term
"mediation."142 Mediators adhere to a variety of styles of mediation, and in
the last few years some commentators and practitioners have questioned the
propriety of a form of mediation that includes an evaluative role for the
mediator.
This Article has explored the developing body of law, largely in the form
of court rules governing mediator practices, stressing the importance of self-
determination by the disputing parties and impartiality by the mediator. Some
of these rules also direct mediators not to give certain advice or opinions.
While this body of law expresses no clear position on the issue of the
propriety of the evaluative style of mediation, the variously worded rules
provide ample reason to question the practice. There is a complex interplay
between the matters of self-determination, impartiality, and the giving of
advice or opinions. When a mediator renders an evaluative opinion, this will
likely serve to influence the disputing parties. This is relevant to both self-
determination and impartiality. The self-determination rules, among other
things, stress that mediators must not act coercively. Mediators are under
pressure to settle a high percentage of matters presented to them for
mediation. In this environment it can be very difficult to separate acceptable
judgmental influence from improper coercion. Though a mediator may be
impartial in the sense that the mediator has no bias or prejudice for a
particular party, rendering an evaluative opinion as part of a mediation
represents a showing of favor. This may well serve to adversely affect the
continuing evenhandedness expected of mediators. Mediation must be
conducted in an impartial manner, and the mediator should display
impartiality throughout the process. It is difficult enough for mediators to
maintain the appearance of impartiality when engaging in common mediator
practices such as asking probing questions, playing the role of devil's
advocate, encouraging objectivity, defusing unrealistic expectations, or
stimulating creative or empathetic thinking. When a mediator actually
expresses an opinion regarding the merits of an issue or the entire case, the
appearance of impartiality is severely challenged. It is widely accepted that
mediators should not provide professional advice to parties to a mediation.
For lawyer-mediators this means no advice about the law. The disputing
parties should look to their own legal representatives for this information.
While some disputes are strictly factual in nature, a great many disputes
142 See Alison E. Gerencser, Alternative Dispute Resolution Has Morphed Into
Mediation: Standards of Conduct Must Be Changed, 50 FLA. L. REV. 843, 846 (1998)
(advocating a change in the standards of professional conduct for mediators to reflect the
proliferation of many different forms of mediation).
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involve issues of both fact and law. For these disputes, when a lawyer-
mediator renders an evaluative opinion, it is base& on a professional opinion
about the law. This is tantamount to giving professional advice.
This Article has also questioned the quality and validity of mediator
evaluations. Valuing a case is far from an exact science. In many mediations,
the mediator has rather limited exposure to the disputed case. Also, a high
percentage of the cases that are submitted to mediation are likely to be cases
for which the prediction of an outcome will be relatively difficult. There is
no empirical research testing the validity of mediator evaluative opinions.143
Data from studies regarding lawyer negotiating skills, lawyer and claims
adjuster case evaluation, and mock jury experiments displays the difficulty of
predicting litigation outcomes, and thus raises serious concern about the
validity of evaluative opinions by mediators. If some mediators are going to
practice evaluative mediation, they should have special skills promoting the
capable performance of this function, 144 and they should be required to
provide extensive information about their qualifications to the disputants. 145 -
Regardless of one's conviction regarding styles or types of mediation,
one undeniable criticism about the present state of affairs is the confusion
stemming from what to expect from mediation. When a disputant agrees to
participate in mediation, that party should not unwittingly agree to an
unexpected process, including, for example, one thatinvolves the rendering
of an advisory evaluative opinion. It is imperative that there be a clear,
advance understanding of the procedure. 146 Disputants and their legal
representatives need to be educated about the nature of different procedures
that are associated with the label "mediation." The parties should engage in
preliminary discussion about the nature of the contemplated and desired
143 Nor is there any research attempting to assess disputant satisfaction with
evaluative mediation in comparison to facilitative mediation. Cf. Chris Guthrie & James
Levin, A "Party Satisfaction" Perspective on a Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 885, 887-88 n.7 (1998) (citing numerous articles reporting
higher levels of satisfaction through mediation compared to litigation).
144 See, e.g., GA. ALTERNATIVE DisP. RESOL. RULES app. B § I(C) (requiring, among
other things, that case evaluators or early neutral evaluators be "lawyers with extensive
subject matter expertise in the area of the litigation in question."); see also, Aaron, supra
note 94 (lauding the use of quantitative decision analysis in mediation).
145 Observe, the proposed Uniform Mediation Act calls upon a mediator to disclose
his or her qualifications to mediate only if asked by a disputant. See supra text
accompanying notes 27-28.
146 See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding
Principle for Truly Educated Decision Making, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775 (1999)
(recommending requirements to help ensure that parties make knowledgeable choices
using mediation).
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process. 147 It is inefficient and perhaps counterproductive to leave this
important discussion to when the parties are at the mediation table and have
already committed, at least in schedule and mind, to a mediation session
before a particular mediator. The decision about process should be made
before the mediator is selected. Then, in selecting the mediator, the parties
will require information about the qualifications, experience, and style of
available mediators.
Refinement and uniformity of the nomenclature for the various
alternative dispute resolution processes would contribute to a much improved
environment. Presently, the official definitions and understanding of the
meaning of the term "mediation" varies across jurisdictions and within
contexts. The adoption of the proposed Uniform Mediation Act would not
fundamentally alter these varying understandings of the process. While this
proposed uniform law provides a much needed common standard for
confidentiality, 148 it provides one general definition of mediation that can
encompass a number of varied processes. 149 Some jurisdictions have
separately defined related processes such as neutral evaluation, 150 mini-
trial,' 5 ' med-arb, 152 or moderated settlement conference. 153 In many
communities these similar processes, all of which involve an evaluative
opinion, are collectively classified or thought of as mediation. It is desirable
to work with uniform practice definitions, and it would be sensible to
distinguish one more process-evaluative mediation.
One might conclude from this article that mediators should not render
evaluative opinions. It seems preferable, however, to allow parties who truly
desire such a process to have access to it. Much of the debate over evaluative
mediation has centered around promoting settlement (pro-evaluation) versus
diminishing interest focused analysis (anti-evaluation). This article has
looked beyond that theoretical debate, exploring fundamental legal
principles, questioning the quality and validity of case evaluation by
mediators, and emphasizing the importance of participant understanding and
informed choice of process.
147 Cf. Lande, supra note 10, at 1 (advocating a pluralistic conception of mediation
and proper advance disclosures of style).
148 UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT §§ 5-8 (Proposed Draft February 2001).
149 See supra text accompanying note 23.
150 E.g., GA. ALTERNATIVE DIsP. RESOL. RuLES app. B § I(C) (West 2001); N.D.
Cal. ADR L.R. 5-1.
151 E.g., S.D. Cal. Civ L.R. 16.3(f); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.024
(West 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 802.12 (West 1998).
152 E.g., MINN. GEN. RULES OF PRAC. FOR THE DIST. CTS. 114.02(a)(9).
153 E.g., TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.025 (West 1999).
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